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1 Uninspiring Rhetoric
Ursula von der Leyen’s promotional tour before her election did not turn out well.
Many, including her compatriots criticised her weak stance on the rule of law. After
being nevertheless voted in – with the support of the two autocratic Central Eastern
European governments against whom Article 7 TEU procedures are pending – she
made a rather infamous statement in the Süddeutsche Zeitung. She claimed, there
were dividing lines between Eastern and Western member states of the European
Union. But von der Leyen failed to point to substantive rule of law issues, rather she
traced back the division to emotional components: allegedly Eastern states do not
feel to be fully respected. This very much corresponds to Hungarian Prime Minister
Viktor Orbán’s stance, who warns the EU from any intervention: “When they question
the rule of law, they step on our honor.”
Adding insult to injury, von der Leyen added that “We all have to learn that achieving
the full rule of law is always what we are aiming at, but nobody is perfect”. It is an
affront to equate half of the electorate with the governments they voted against,
including citizens from authoritarian states whose last stray of hope to halt rule of law
backsliding was external intervention. They now feel “disappointed, frustrated – but
most of all: betrayed”.
Curbing election laws, capturing the judiciary, and mass fundamental rights
violations in Hungary for example led Freedom House conclude – for the first time
since the democratic transition in 1989/90, and for the first time in EU history – that
an EU Member State is to be downgraded from “free” to a “partly free country”.
In light of these sustained attacks on the country’s democratic institutions by
the government, von der Leyen’s statement is a polite euphemism at best, or an
evidence proving that the Commission President is oblivious to reality, or even
worse: she seems to turn a blind eye to gross and systemic violations of values
enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. Some of von der Leyen’s other symbolic moves also
proved that she was ready to compromise values for political convenience: Baptising
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the migration portfolio’s holder as Vice-President for “Protecting our European way of
Life” was heavily criticized for normalising hate mongering, xenophobia, and giving in
to the far right in general.
But let us have a look beyond the ignorant political rhetoric of the President elect and
explore what the new Commission might entail for the rule of law. The organigram
of the future Commission is rather complex, and the issue of the rule of law is
overarching, but its enforcement seems to be divided among three Commissioners:
the Vice-President for Values and Transparency; the Commissioner for Justice;
and the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement. I shall begin with the
first two portfolios, related to the rule of law internally within the EU, and discuss
neighbourhood and enlargement policy separately.
2. Internally Focused Portfolios
2.1 Vice-President for Values and Transparency
The lack of a Commissioner entrusted specifically with rule of law issues is what
strikes one at a first glance. Whereas First Vice-President Frans Timmermans
used to be responsible for the rule of law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
he is now entrusted with a different portfolio – the European Green Deal – and
his successor’s, V#ra Jourová’s position is entitled Vice-President for Values and
Transparency now. Her title is thus lacking any specific reference to the rule of law
(or fundamental rights for that matter) whereas transparency, nowhere mentioned in
Article 2 TEU, is “upgraded” with no clear rationale having been offered for this. Such
a change might indicate a lesser emphasis on the rule of law, but at the same time
might also make sense with special regard to the triangular nature of democracy, the
rule of law and fundamental rights, where these three values “cannot be separated
without inflicting profound damage to the whole and changing its essential shape and
configuration”.
According to the mission letter that was sent by von der Leyen, Jourovà will have
a wide portfolio covering multiple topics including the Spitzenkandidaten–Prozess,
electoral laws, transparency of the legislative process, European identity, European
citizenship and the European Citizens’ Initiative. Looking at this list and potential
overlaps, one may wonder how the Commissioner for Democracy and Demography
will kill her time in office. Jourovà will also have some rights-related tasks, such
as EU accession to the ECHR, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, dialogue with
churches and religious associations or communities, as well as with philosophical
and non-confessional organisations.
This already extensive portfolio is further extended by the duty of making democracy
resilient, promoting, strengthening and defending the EU’s rights and values, and
upholding the rule of law. With regard to this latter task, the Vice-President will work
closely with the Commissioner for Justice, the prime responsible for enforcing the
rule of law in the member states.
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2.2 Commissioner for Justice
The Commissioner for Justice has the key job to enforce the rule of law in the
Member States. The position will be held by current Belgian Foreign Minister Didier
Reynders.
Looking at the organisation chart, it is unclear how the issue of the rule of law will
be divided between Reynders and the Vice-President for Values and Transparency
who is overseeing the Justice Commissioner. But since Reynders will hold the only
Commissioner position subordinated to the Vice-President, the question arises
whether it makes sense to create a hierarchy between the two in the first place.
Some tasks enshrined in the mission letter are remotely or only indirectly related
to the rule of law, such as rights derived from European citizenship, consumer
protection, the use of new digital technologies, artificial intelligence, the fight
against terrorism, the setting up of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the
implementation and enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation, or
company law supporting small and medium-sized businesses.
Other tasks in Reynders’ portfolio are strictly rule of law related, even though self-
evident, such as taking cases to the CJEU, which the Commission does by law
as guardian of the treaties in the form of infringement cases. Additionally, the
Commissioner for Justice will be entrusted with strengthening the cooperation
on rule of law matters with international organisations, such as the Council of
Europe, the OSCE and the OSCD. Reynders will lead the Commission’s work on the
comprehensive European Rule of Law Mechanism and coordinate the Commission’s
annual reporting. He will focus on communication and awareness-raising with regard
to rule of law problems; will prevent and identify breaches; and propose effective,
proportionate and dissuasive responses.
2.3 The Keys to Success
Whereas von der Leyen’s rhetoric has been uninspiring so far from a rule of law
perspective, and the future Commission design leaves a lot to be desired (see
the overbroad portfolios the overlapping subjects, the lack of specific reference to
values, the structure, etc.), the proof of the new Commission’s stance will be in the
substantive moves. Here the Commission’s Communication on the State of play and
possible next steps of April 2019 and its Rule of Law Blueprint for Action of July 2019
provide some guidance (assessed in detail by Pech, Kochenov and others here and
here). Let me formulate a few requirements for Commission action to be successful
in the area of the rule of law.
Emphasis on Enforcement, the Limits of a Discursive Approach
Both von der Leyen in the already referenced interview entitled “Not the worst
threat right at the beginning”, and the Blueprint emphasize that response must
be a last resort. Reynders also seems to believe that discussion is the key to
rule of law problems – at least his name is associated with the Belgian-German
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proposal for a Periodic Peer Review of the Rule of Law in the EU, which would
set up a regular interactive discussion on an expert level, and on a political level
in the General Affairs Council. This shows that key political actors still believe in
prevention and dialogue without intervention. And indeed, the discursive approach
might work well with member states that respect the rules of the game and in the
overall assessment adhere to the concept of liberal democracy. But when it comes
to systemic rule of law backsliding the strength of any EU reaction will depend on
whether the Commission recognises that effectiveness hinges on the “response”
or “enforcement” prong. The Commission must realize after a decade of rule of law
violations in Hungary and with several member states joining the illiberal club that
any other approach is entirely ineffective vis-à-vis rogue governments. There should
be room for member states under review to present their arguments and pieces of
evidence underpinning their positions. But once it becomes clear that a government
acts in bad faith, the Commission should acknowledge that further dialogue will only
result in granting sufficient time to complete the capture of state institutions and
solidifying an authoritarian state structure.
Dialogue v. Mockery of a Dialogue, Abuse of Concepts
A related issue is the need to recognise when parties engage in a meaningful debate
and when governments just abuse (typically legal) concepts to pretend there was
a dialogue. A common tactic is a reference to the vagueness of the rule of law
contending it was an elusive term. In reality however, the Commission itself offered a
definition of the rule of law back in 2014, inspired by the Venice Commission’s Rule
of Law report and checklist of 2011.
The other approach by rogue governments is claiming that there was an
alternative (perhaps Central Eastern European) understanding of the rule of law /
constitutionalism /constitutional identity that must be respected by Western states.
Even if these were genuine claims (which they are not, see Kelemen and Pech), the
Commission should make clear that these concepts cannot be used to go against
European minimum standards, neither can they be employed as a carte blanche
authorization to overwrite EU laws. But most importantly, the Commission should
recognize that these claims do not form parts of multi-level constitutionalism, and
shall be deconstructed as simple delusions that are only created either to escape
liability for violating the rule of law and democracy or to gain more time in doing that
(see below). Agreeing with the succinct explanation by Kovács and Tóth, there is “a
crucial difference between a dialogue among constitutionalists within the framework
of constitutional democracy and a dialogue with delegates of a constitutional
simulacrum.”
The Time Element
That leads me to my next point that time is on the side of those destroying the
rule of law. As distinguished scholars on this blog reminded us, “[c]alling for more
dialogue while simultaneously normalising the systemic, deliberate and deceitful
annihilation of checks and balances we are witnessing in both Poland and Hungary
on the ground that ‘nobody’s perfect’ constitute an approach which will only lead
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to more time being wasted even while rule of law backsliding is spreading to more
EU countries and endangering the very survival of the EU legal order.” The EU’s
constitutional system should imply the existence of robust precautionary measures
against anti-constitutional tendencies and forces. As we have argued earlier this year
(see here), the only tested legal remedy against rule of law backsliding so far seems
to be the use of expedited and prioritized infringement procedure in conjunction with
interim measures to prevent more harm from being done.
Contextual Assessment by an Independent Body
When assessing member states – which will happen along the so-called Rule of
Law Review Cycle (RLRC) according to the Blueprint –, further factors need to
be considered. As we argued earlier, a “rule of law evaluation shall be a nuanced
exercise, and particular care shall be taken to make a contextual analysis and not
to rely on a standardised benchmarking system that could veil or blur problems –
thereby doing more harm than good”. A tick the box type of assessment may allow
governments to hide their real objectives by pointing to international examples
and claiming that there was nothing unique about their policies. Whereas it may
be true that formally a state employed some legal transplants working well in
other jurisdictions, a qualitative analysis might reveal that foreign legal transplants
were taken out of context, or other countries’ worst practices were borrowed and
combined.
A related challenge is the preservation of the RLRC’s legitimacy when autocratic
governments question the validity of EU condemnations and challenge the legitimacy
of the critic. The concept of a political Commission will only make the attack easier.
As Kochenov convincingly proved, the “perceived politicization has [already]
fundamentally undermined the EU’s action in an area of most fundamental concern:
its rule of law and democratic nature.” One could have hoped that von der Leyen
abandons this concept, given that she could not point to a mandate from the
European Parliament. But evidence suggests the contrary.
She has her own political agenda including gender equality and an environmental
policy with a leftish-green flavour. Von der Leyen also defines this Commission as a
geopolitical one, stressing that “what we do at home will affect our place in the world
and will shape relations with our strategic partners and competitors” (see the mission
letter sent to the High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security Policy). Further
she talks about an EU that is guardian of multilateralism, avoiding the language of
“guardian of the treaties”.
So as to avoid the easy criticism that the critic is too political in the sense of not
being neutral, a body detached from any political institutions shall be at the core of
rule of law assessment.
Should all the above factors be taken into account, the RLRC will have a chance to
tackle the problem of rule of law demise. Also, it will be very similar to the European
Parliament’s 2016 proposal on an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and
fundamental rights. It would be beneficial to know whether the RLRC is supposed to
complement or overwrite it.
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3 The External Rule of Law Related Portfolio
3.1 Commissioner for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement
Some other concessions von der Leyen made when designing the future
Commission reinforce the suspicion that she is willing to compromise the rule of
law whenever required for political gains. At the time of writing, it seems that both
member states currently subject to Article 7 TEU proceedings for clear risks of
serious breaches of the rule of law (Poland) and all of the values laid down in Article
2 TEU (Hungary) get the positions they wished for. In the case of Hungary this will
be the portfolio for neighbourhood and enlargement. The Commissioner will be
entrusted with overseeing whether candidate or neighbouring countries are fulfilling
the Copenhagen criteria, or in the language of the mission letter, whether they
ensure the rule of law, the fight against corruption, the role of an independent media
and civil society. In other words, the Hungarian Commissioner will be responsible for
overseeing respect for values that his or her government has been systematically
and deliberately undermined as made clear as early as 2013 by the European
Parliament’s Tavares report. The Hungarian expression “setting the goat to watch
the cabbage” comes to mind. As Végh argues, the nomination would “further
undermine the already weakened normative power of the European Union in its
own neighbourhood.” Equally important is the perception by third countries: they will
undoubtedly see such a political decision “as a betrayal, an abandonment by the
EU.”
3.2 Calling a Spade a Shovel
The first Hungarian candidate, former Justice Minister Trócsányi was rejected by
the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) “on the grounds of
conflicts of interest”. The law firm he founded carried out tasks for the Hungarian
government, and especially the Russia-related contracts bothered those who voted
him down. These are severe issues, but they shall not hide the fact that Trócsányi
was Justice Minister during a period which lead the EU to have an Article 7 TEU
procedure opened against Hungary. His name is connected to the establishment of
a controversial administrative court system (which the government first suspended,
and seems to abandon it altogether now, due to international pressure); it was under
his ministership that people were sent to prison for being homeless; the ECtHR had
to intervene again and again so that asylum seekers are given food in the transit
zones; and the list goes on. Dumping him on grounds of conflict of interest is like
sentencing Al Capone for tax evasion. It is easier to prove but does not even come
close to the real issue.
To prevent any misunderstandings: I am not singling out and equalling individuals to
gangsters. Neither am I introducing such a metaphor for governments abusing the
law when violating the rule of law. (My peers did this, coining unconquerably creative
terms such as constitutional vandalism, legal hooliganism, constitutional barbarism,
or the Belarusisation of the EU from within.) Instead I criticise the EU for framing the
issue the wrong way. Because asking the right legal questions is half the victory.
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Should the problem be misconstrued as an individual issue of a single politician, the
Hungarian government can just replace him (and indeed Viktor Orbán was quick
to nominate Olivér Várhelyi, a controversial but experienced diplomat, Hungary’s
ambassador to the EU). Instead the allocation of portfolios shall reflect that the
problem is not located in one particular nominee. In order to be true to the idea of
Article 2 TEU values, Portfolios should have been reshuffled. Nobody who served
under a government destroying the rule of law should be entrusted with overseeing
the very same value externally. Otherwise von der Leyen’s promise “to defend our
common values and uphold the rule of law” sounds nothing but an empty slogan, a
masquerade, undermining the Commission’s credibility.
Instead of taking the rule of law seriously along the above lines, von der Leyen
invited governments to nominate female candidates. Gender balance is important,
but in the light of the severe consequences rule of law rot in some of the member
states has for the whole EU construct, such a requirement is nothing but a mouche
on the ugly face of emerging authoritarianism in the heart of Europe. (And not even
this cosmetic requirement was respected. Hungary got away with not nominating
candidates from both genders, as von der Leyen ultimately approved the second
Hungarian male nominee.)
But let’s not rush into things. We shall evaluate the von der Leyen Commission
on the basis of what it will do in terms of the rule of law, and not what they say –
no matter how ill-advised or misguided the Commission President’s rule of law
pronouncements have been to date.
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